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
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
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


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PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANS:
THE NEGLECTED INSTRUMENT OF POWER
IN THE U.S. STRATEGIC ARSENAL

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HERBERT L. ALTSHULER, IN

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Implementing plans are the ways, and the tools, weapons and instruments are the means. The arsenal of means available to each player in the game of international strategy formulation and implementation consists primarily of diplomatic, economic, military, and socio-psychological instruments. These instruments are used alone or in concert with one another as the situation dictates, and some are not used at all. The United States has traditionally utilized the economic and military means in pursuit of national strategy. Although diplomacy has been more widely used in the second half of this century, socio-psychological means are still not effectively utilized. This paper examines the psychological instrument of statecraft as it relates to public opinion, foreign policy, and national security strategy. It defines its terms, examines its employment, discusses limitations to its effectiveness, and describes requirements for its future applications.

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**PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANS:
THE NEGLECTED INSTRUMENT OF POWER IN THE U.S. STRATEGIC ARSENAL**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HERBERT L. ALTSHULER, IN

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**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
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PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANS:
THE NEGLECTED INSTRUMENT OF POWER IN THE U.S. STRATEGIC ARSENAL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Strategy is defined in terms of ends, ways, and means.¹ The ends are usually the objectives, or overall goals to be achieved. The means are the instruments of statecraft, usually described as diplomatic, economic, military, or socio-psychological. They are those powers of a nation or society through which ends are realized. The ways are the methods of employing these instruments; the doctrine or tactics by which the means are brought to bear in achieving the ends. The United States applies the instruments of power, (the means) in pursuit of national policy objectives, (the ends) around the world in different ways and with varying degrees of success. The impact of her actions is not always accurately interpreted, and the actions themselves are not always perceived as intended. In fact, the psychological effects of pursuing national policy are often left to chance. Great pains are taken to apply the appropriate instrument to achieve the

desired end, but the "side effects" are neither forecasted nor well managed. As a separate instrument of power, or to explain, support, augment, or exploit the use of the other three, separately or together; "The psychological dimension of national power is the least understood..., the hardest to quantify, and the most difficult to effectively apply to national strategy"² of all that are in the strategic arsenal. The United States is very effective at projecting power to achieve policy, but not at all effective at projecting policy to achieve power. The former suggests influence from power projected through diplomatic weight, economic strength, or military might; the latter, power derived from the influence of clearly stated, consistently applied and conservatively executed national policy. Public declaration of national intent, supported by credible demonstration of national resolve can influence the world community, solidifying passions and creating power.

Clauswitz suggests that a nation's strength emanates from its center of gravity,³ that critical point from which a nation's power flows, the correct identification of which is vital to the people of that nation and the correct perception of which is important to its friends, allies, and adversaries alike. It has also been suggested that the center of gravity of the United States is her values, and that U.S. national strategy includes not only the protection of those values, but

the projection of them as well. Traditionally, the United States has done this through diplomatic, economic, and military means. The use of psychological power has been neglected.

This paper will examine the psychological instrument of power as it relates to public opinion, foreign policy, and national security strategy. It will define its terms, examine its employment, discuss limitations to its effectiveness, and describe requirements for its future applications.

To aid in discussion and to insure semantics don't confuse substance, it is appropriate to define terms commonly found in the lexicon of psychological activities. These definitions appear in the annex. Notice that nowhere in any of these definitions are there implications, connotations or requirements for subjugating, altering or distorting truth.

Psychological activities concern themselves with the most effective way to present the truth, and truth is the best propaganda! Positioning facts to focus attention on the positive while de-emphasizing the negative and still presenting a balanced view, is the essence of the art of communication. Public communication, which uses both information and propaganda to educate and influence large audiences through mass media communications strive to do just that. Critics suggest that in selecting which facts will be focused or presented and which facts will be de-emphasized or withheld, the truth becomes distorted. When both sides of an issue are

presented, balance is achieved. Weighting one side or the other in the discussion of the advantages or disadvantages of an issue is not distortion either, unless the discussion includes fabrication, falsehood, or lies.

In the international arena it is sometimes necessary to withhold certain details of a policy, program, or plan for security reasons, but a wise government adept at public diplomacy and public communication will not lie. Psychological warfare allows for deception and covert activities in times of war, but psychological means used to explain and garner support both at home and abroad, for its national strategies must deal only in the truth. To not do so would prejudice the use of the psychological instrument and degrade its effectiveness.

CHAPTER II

PUBLIC OPINION

*"...no American program, no plan for world order, can succeed unless it has the full support of public opinion, both home and abroad;...at home there are large areas of ignorance and prejudice about foreign affairs; abroad there are large segments of misinformation and suspicion about us;...unless we educate public opinion at home, we shall not be impelled to do the job in foreign policy that needs to be done; unless we make ourselves understood abroad; no matter how good our intentions, we shall fail."*⁴ "Public opinion has become...a powerful instrument of national policy."⁵ It is the stuff from which national will is made and therefore a third of the Clauswitzian triumverate which requires full, balanced participation of the government, the people, and the military for the success of any national policy (peaceful or otherwise).⁶ In the broader arena of global strategy, any of the other instruments of power can be substituted for the military in Clauswitz's theory without altering its validity. What is this vital component of national strategy? How is it informed, influenced?

Opinions are as plentiful as there are people on the

planet.

Opinions are formed constantly without conscious effort. Information from all sources is continuously received and filtered through a complex network of values, attitudes, perceptions, superstitions, and prejudices previously implanted by family, culture, religion, education, and personal belief. Once filtered, it is synthesized, analyzed, and adopted; added to the individual's body of knowledge, (what he knows or believes to be true), or discarded. That which is retained forms, or reshapes the frame of reference from which judgements are made. These judgements not only govern behavior, but also reflect personal opinions. Consensus of individual personal opinion comprises public opinion. Because public opinion reflects consensus, it has impact. The extent of its impact is relative to how well informed, how interested, and how influential the group whose opinion it represents is in the society or in the policy making machinery of that society. In a liberal democracy, an interested, informed, and influential public is necessary for realistic policy formulation, and essential for its successful execution. Public opinion becomes informed through education. It is influenced by mass communication.⁷

In an open society like the United States and other democracies, the consensus of the general public, the man in the street, the community leader, the key communicator, the

voter is critical not only in support of elected officials, but also to the execution of the policies espoused by those officials. In a closed society, like the Soviet Union and other totalitarian states, it is the consensus of the political hierarchy that keeps leaders in power, policy in effect, and the system in motion. Both societies seek the consensus of members of the world community to give legitimacy, credibility, and acceptability to their policies. Personal opinion, public opinion and world opinion are formed by information that creates consensus. They are influenced by propaganda (in its benign and positive form), which focuses these opinions and gives them power to affect national policy and world events.

"There are three molders of public opinion in the United States; the government, the press,[to include all the media of mass communications],and citizen groups,[public forums, civic clubs, business and professional fraternities and sororities]." ⁸ At one time, the United States government was the major force in this arena. Somehow it has abrogated this role, and today of the three cited above, "The press [media of mass communication]... is the most potent of the opinion forces." ⁹ Sensationalism in the "news", universal appeal of radio, and the drama of visual images on television have captured the imagination and attention of the public which now relies on the mass communication media to focus its opinions on issues of policy. The government meanwhile has become

reactive. Rather than preparing information explaining its programs and policies before implementation, the government reacts to "news" after the fact that may be accurate or not, but will certainly be antagonistic. This may make good copy for the news, but it doesn't make a very a well informed public at home or abroad. Nor does it allow discussion, modification, or consensus to form before implementation. It does, however, put the government in the position of always having to defend its programs or policies before they can even be explained.

It is the function of the free press in a pluralistic society to question government, inform the public and even investigate unusual practices or unexplained events. We would not have it otherwise. In so doing however, the liberal anti-government heritage of the fourth estate usurps the right of the public to hear both sides of an issue. A one sided debate is no debate at all.

By neglecting the use of psychological means to garner support for its position, policies, and activities, the government has surrendered to the mass communications industry its ability to influence public opinion. The employees of this industry, (reporters, talk show hosts, and news anchor persons), now attempt to explain what they perceive government policy to be and what it means. They now mold public opinion, and they do it very effectively if not always accurately.

This process is not healthy for the government, the nation, or the American public, because the government plays to its critics, the nation appears to lack resolve, and the American people never get a clear explanation of both sides of the issues.

Past policies have been hampered and some have even failed as a result of this phenomenon. The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), for example, has been discredited in this manner. Rather than coming forth with an influential public information program fully explaining its purpose, features, benefits, advantages, and costs immediately following the President's announcement; explanations, interpretations, and perceptions were left to the liberal "Media" which promptly dubbed the whole concept Star Wars. "The fact that the derogatory term, STAR WARS, has been publicly attached to the SDI program has aided the Soviets considerably in their propaganda campaigns against it. The term evokes subconscious perceptions of science and fantasy... and the term *wars* is perceived as aggressive rather defensive."¹⁰ Likewise, the media moniker, Neutron Bomb was a key element in preventing the deployment of enhanced radiation weapons in Europe during the Carter Administration.¹¹ Finally, the repeated reference to the terrorists and kidnappers as "students" during the 1979 U.S. embassy hostage crisis created erroneous public perceptions.¹²

This significantly hampered the timely formulation of an effective plan to deal with the situation. The fact that frequent misinformation is provided in a competitive attempt to be the first with the news, the catch-phrase, or the dramatic headline, photo, or video is unfortunate. Despite this, the major publishers and networks do their jobs well. The problem is that not only is the United States Government neglecting its responsibility to inform the public of what it is doing and why, it is also ignoring its most significant means to influence public and world opinion to support its national policies.

CHAPTER III

LIMITING FACTORS

Many factors contribute to the neglect of the psychological instrument. Among them is what can be called the Goebbels Syndrome. Prior to 1939 and the rise of the National Socialist Party in Germany, the word, PROPAGANDA (communication to influence), held no particular connotation. Throughout history, in religion as well as politics, mass communication had been used to convert the unbeliever, reinforce the faithful, and re-orient the errant. "The orations of Pericles and Cicero were indubitably propaganda...the torch bearers of the French Revolution; Voltaire and Rousseau, as well as those of the American Revolution; Paine and Jefferson were also propagandists. Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points are still recognized as propaganda addressed to a global audience."¹³ Then came Adolph Hitler and with him, Doctor Josef Goebbels, Minister of Information (Propaganda?) for the Third Reich. Goebbels' programs were to influence public opinion to create popular support for Hitler's rule.¹⁴ The frightfulness of his

methods; the lies, the signs, symbols and banners, the vast assemblies, the unrelenting assault on our emotions, and the thunderous, grating utterances of the Feuhrer are burnt into our consciousness forever.¹⁵ It is from these images, and their results; ("We have made the Reich by propaganda", said Goebbels in 1939...),¹⁶ that the term propaganda, regardless of its actual definitions, has become synonymous with evil. It conjurs up visions of manipulation, exploitation, extermination, and lies. The legacy of Dr. Goebbels in the aftermath of the Third Reich was to redefine the meaning of propaganda, and taint the conduct of psychological activities by free societies. The United States is no exception. We too are intimidated by the Goebbels Syndrome.

Another limiting factor in the use of psychological power by the United States is the lack of a versatile, Congressionally supported, and adequately funded mechanism at the national level to plan, coordinate, and employ psychological means in the pursuit of national objectives at home or abroad. Traditionally, the Department of State has been charged with the planning and employment of this instrument of power during peacetime. During war, the military, specifically the Army, has conducted psychological operations in support of national military objectives through various organizations formed to conduct psychological warfare when needed.

In 1917 The Committee on Public Information, (The Creel Committee) was created under the leadership of Mr. George Creel to coordinate U.S. information strategy during World War I. It was abolished by congress at the war's end. In 1941, The Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) was formed as a comprehensive organization for psychological warfare. Later transferred to the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) the COI was superseded by the Office of War Information (OWI) in 1942 (under Elmer Davis) as the U.S. agency chiefly responsible for psychological warfare strategy during World War II. This organization assimilated other propaganda machinery such as Voice of America, established earlier the same year, and met with reasonable success, (The Italian Campaign), but never really reached its full potential. It too, was dissolved at the end of the war.

Commenting on the U.S. employment of psychological means after the war, a former OWI official wrote, "Americans attained considerable skill in the use of propaganda as an instrument of war, they failed completely to develop the art of persuasion as an instrument of foreign policy."¹⁷ That situation has not changed today. Other organizations were formed to conduct psychological operations during the Korean and Vietnam wars but were similarly dissolved or deactivated at the end of hostilities.

It was not until the Reagan Administration embraced public

diplomacy as a means to pursue a psychological strategy in support of national objectives, that the Interagency Organization for Public Diplomacy was established by National Security Decision Document 77 (NSDD 77) in January 1983.¹⁸ This organization, a standing interagency group consisting of representatives from The United States Information Agency (USIA), National Security Council (NSC), Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), The Agency for International Development (AID), and The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), (in special situations authorized by the President), is to coordinate the operations of the nation's psychological assets. Perhaps this will provide the mechanism needed to project psychological power. This was the first effort on the part of an American president to recognize and attempt to put to positive use the psychological instrument in peace time. As currently configured, this interagency organization is not a full time plenary body, but rather meets from time to time to consider the appropriateness of public diplomacy initiatives to be included in speeches by national leaders. It does not proscribe, coordinate, or direct any ongoing programs. It has no staff, it has no budget and it has no other resources dedicated to it. A definite step in the right direction but at present, its charter is too broad, its responsibilities too ill defined, and its political restrictions too numerous.

The psychological programs The United States currently employs fall under the purview of either the United States Information Agency (USIA) in the public diplomacy arena, or the United States Military which has responsibility for:

1. Psychological Operations Units.
2. Port Visits (with Ambassadorial approval).
3. Combined Training Exercises.
4. Security Assistance (with State Department approval).
5. Military to Military Interface.

These are very specialized and correspondingly limited programs that fail to project policy to all but the most specific audiences.

The efforts of USIA, on the other hand, concentrate on telling America's story overseas through news and information programs. These include:

1. Voice of America.
2. Radio Free Europe.
3. Radio Liberty.
4. Radio Marti.
5. Worldnet.
6. U.S. Information Libraries Overseas.
7. Educational Exchange Programs.
8. Trade, Art, and Cultural Exhibits and Exchanges sponsored and supported by government and the private sector.

These programs, aimed at large general audiences are designed to enlighten, not to influence, and while they may reach decision makers, key communicators, and centers of public influence, they are not specifically tailored to do so. Their objectives are primarily to educate, rather than to persuade; they report events, rather than explain policy; and they operate as independent programs, rather than as part of a comprehensive, coordinated campaign.

Another limiting factor, and the one that probably restricts use of psychological means in policy projection most is Congressional constraint through legislation and appropriation. The scope of the activities of any agency of the U.S. Government is controlled by the Congress which must pass enabling legislation for its formation, operating parameters, and intended purpose. It must also appropriate funds for continued operations.

While individual members of Congress fully appreciate the importance of influencing public opinion, since that's what made them Congressmen, as a body they seem to fall prey to the Goebbels Syndrome when it comes to persuasive communications in international affairs. "Whenever propagandists (or even members of that lesser included tribe, public relations men) approach its corridors, Congress sounds the alarm."¹⁹ A 1913 law still on the books, "...makes unlawful the use of federal funds for compensation of any publicity expert unless

specifically appropriated for that purpose."²⁰

Strange indeed, that in a nation that owes so much of its economic prosperity to advertising, and whose much revered process for selecting its leadership, from dog catcher to President, relies very heavily on advertising campaigns to influence the opinions of the voting public; the legislators would be reluctant to employ the same process in the foreign policy arena. After all, "...what is advertising, but propaganda intended to win friends, and influence people to buy a particular product [or idea]? What are the speeches of the denouncers of propaganda except propaganda for their own legislative remedies?"²¹ The larger picture is often more difficult to see, however, and where foreign policy is concerned, the congress neither understands nor appreciates the nuances and complexities of the psychological instrument. When dealing officially with the subject, its debate is uninformed, its legislation is irrelevant, and its interference is overbearing. ²²

In a way, this is to be expected. Although the congress appears to be a monolithic, omnipotent legislative body, it is actually a group of individuals elected by the residents of their state or district to represent those areas at the national level. They are experts on the issues of concern to their constituency. National security, foreign policy, power projection, international relations and the strategies designed

to achieve them are seen through a regional perspective and judged on the value they hold for that region and its population. The Congress insures that the checks and balances built into our system of government are at work; that the separation of powers of the three major branches of government is intact; that tax dollars are spent where they are most needed and will do the most good; and that the rights of all citizens are protected equally by the laws of the land.

Its members tend not to support programs they do not understand. many of them do not see the need for the government, in this case the executive branch, to "advertise" its programs. Some say it's a waste of money; that the media does more than an adequate job in informing the public of administration programs and policies; and that opinion polls provide sufficient information to influence public attitudes and behavior. Others claim to officially "advertise" our policies at home and abroad would give too much information to our adversaries, still others say it would give too much influence to the executive branch at the expense of the legislature. Finally, there are also those who feel that a national public information program paid for by tax dollars designed to "propagandize" the taxpayer is erosive of citizenship rights.

These are interesting arguments, but they reflect a lack of understanding of the scope, range and versatility of

psychological activities. Properly planned and coordinated programs for public communications and public diplomacy will insure that accurate information is provided and information of a sensitive nature is safeguarded. These programs will also insure that tax dollars are spent to better educate taxpayers so that they might make better informed decisions about who they elect to regulate their taxes.

Timeliness is another contributor to congressional reluctance to sanction or support psychological programs. Elected officials are men and women of action, they want to see immediate results from any program. So do their constituents. Most Americans do too. "It is extremely difficult to estimate the effects of any psychological activity. The impact may be subtle; sometimes effects are not noticeable for years. Since the men responsible for [these activities] cannot provide a cage full of ex-communists converted by VOA, appropriations are hard to get."²³ The Congress is reluctant to appropriate funds for long term programs the results of which are difficult to measure. It is not just the amounts of money appropriated (or not appropriated) to psychological programs that inhibit their effectiveness. These programs require coordinated campaigns conducted over the long term.

The current congressional budgetary process does not support long range programs. Increasing appropriations one year and reducing them the next, forces program managers to

spend valuable time expanding and retrenching, instead of conducting operations on the basis of long range coherent plans.²⁴ Long range programs require long range budgets. This limitation will continue to make itself felt until a fully budgeted mechanism is established to conduct psychological activities.

Finally, policy projection by any means is limited by the confusion arising from the contradictions of various government agencies as to what is U.S. policy. In his article "Deciding Who Makes Foreign Policy", New York Times Magazine, 18 September, 1983, former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski expressed concern for this problem when he said "Foreign policy and domestic policy have become increasingly intertwined. Today the public at large, mass media, and the Congress all insist on participating in the process."²⁵ There are simply too many players in the game. Almost every government agency has its own public affairs officers, spokespersons, and "informed sources" making statements, official and unofficial to public audiences both foreign and domestic each day. These statements are filtered through reporters, editors, and newscasters who interpret, second guess and editorialize the already unclear statements of the agency. What's even more confusing is that U.S. policy is always subject to revision, reprioritization, or change with administrations or partisan influence in Congress. Long term programs for policy projection require long term policies.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

As the leader of the free world, the United States interests are worldwide. Our democratic principles, economic prosperity, and basic human rights form the model for free societies and fuel the aspirations of men everywhere. Therefore, U.S. national strategy must be global. Its ends must be universal, the means fully integrated, and employed in new and imaginative ways. National policies that support the strategy have to be clear, concise, and universally understood both at home and overseas. The objectives of the policies need to be explained, and support for them needs to come from national public and world opinion. Accomplishing this requires skillful use of all the instruments of power in the strategic arsenal. Traditionally, the United States has been most effective in its use of the diplomatic, economic and military instruments. It has not however, developed its psychological capability to its fullest potential.

Major reasons for this are:

1. A national aversion to association with anything perceived to be false or evil, (The Goebbels Syndrome).
2. The complexities, subtleties, lack of immediately quantifiable results and margin for error inherent in psychological activities.
3. Reluctance to apply commercial advertising techniques to matters as important as foreign policy.
4. Lack of a viable mechanism to plan, coordinate, and monitor a national information program.
5. Lack of clearly articulated, long range national policy goals.
6. Political, legislative, and material constraints.

For these and other reasons previously stated, PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANS ARE THE NEGLECTED INSTRUMENT(S) OF POWER IN THE U.S. STRATEGIC ARSENAL.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

"If the United States is to be successful in furthering its global interests while concurrently maintaining international peace and security, it must find a way to communicate with world audiences and gain support for its policies in the critical area of world public opinion."²⁶ Likewise, it must adopt a program of public information to inform the national public opinion at home in a similar manner. With this in mind the following recommendations are made:

1. A mechanism for the planning, coordination and dissemination of public diplomacy and public communication be developed. The Interagency Organization for Public Diplomacy is a start.

2. This mechanism be highly placed in the governmental hierarchy, with stature and prestige equal to that of the other agencies responsible for employing the other instruments of power.²⁷

3. This mechanism have rapid, lateral, flexible, and non-interruptible access to these other agencies, and that vertical access to the National Security Council, the Cabinet and the President is possible and easy.²⁸

4. The members of Congress be better educated as to the necessity, effectiveness, and the honesty of a national campaign to tell America's story .

5. The Congress be a part of the mechanism through direct participation, representation, oversight privileges or some combination of each.

6. Some aspect of the psychological instrument be employed with any and all of the other three whenever and wherever they are used.

7. The free press become a partner in the dissemination of information, not without challenge or debate, but without the adversarial antagonism that characterizes the current relationship.

8. The national mechanism for psychological activities also give guidance for the conduct of military psychological operations in peace and war.

9. The national mechanism have permanent status, permanent full time employees, an operating budget, and a stated mission approved by Congress and recognized by all three branches of government.

10. The national mechanism be permitted and encouraged to utilize the vast resources of the academic, commercial and private sectors to accomplish its mission.

ENDNOTES

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2. Melvin E. Kreisel, Psyop: A Strategic Dimension, pp.1.
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4. Lester Markel, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, pp. 3.
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11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Markel, pp. 15.
14. Oren Stephens, Facts to a Candid World, pp. 10.
15. Markel, pp. 15.
16. Ibid.

17. Kreisel, pp. 2-B.
18. Ibid., pp. 6.
19. Markel, pp. 12.
20. Ibid., pp. 13.
21. Ibid., pp. 12.
22. Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Veld, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy, pp. 47.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., pp. 46.
25. Kreisel, pp. 8.
26. Ibid., pp. 22.
27. Holt, pp. 76.
28. Ibid.

ANNEX

DEFINITIONS

1. INFORMATION: Communication of facts and opinions in an effort to enlighten.¹

2. PUBLIC INFORMATION: Information which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support.²

3. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: The use of international information programs together with cultural exchanges to create ideas and attitudes which support foreign policy and national goals. It includes international political activities used in conjunction with information, cultural and educational programs to develop democratic infrastructures. A public affairs component is used to explain foreign policy initiatives and programs to the general public and gain their support.³

4. PROPAGANDA:

A. [derived] from the modern latin title, Congregatio de Propaganda fide, more fully, Congregation or College of the Propaganda; [which was] a committee of Cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church having the care and oversight of foreign missions, founded in 1622. Any association, systematic scheme or concerted movement⁴ for the propagation of a particular doctrine or practice.

B. Communication of facts (or non-facts) and opinions in an effort to influence.⁵

C. The attempt to influence behavior in the direction of some relatively specific and explicit goal by affecting through the use of mass media of communication, the manner in which a mass audience perceives and ascribes meaning to the material world.⁶

D. "Language aimed at large masses"...for the purpose of influencing mass attitudes on controversial issues.⁷

E. Consists of the planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds, emotions and actions of a given group for a specific purpose.⁸

5. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

6. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: These operations include psychological warfare and in addition, encompass those political, military, economic and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.¹⁸

7. STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: Planned psychological activities in peace and war, which normally pursue objectives to gain the support and cooperation of friendly and neutral countries and to reduce the will and capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries to wage war.¹¹

END NOTES TO ANNEX

1. Lester Markel, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, pp. 16.
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3. U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Operations, Public Diplomacy and the Future Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session, 21 June 1977, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1977), pp. 216-219; National Security Council Memorandum, 18 April 1983, Subject: NSDD-77 on Public Diplomacy, with attachment dated 14 January 1983, Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security, as quoted in Kreisel, pp. 4-A.
4. The Oxford Universal Dictionary, pp. 1599.
5. Markel, pp. 16.
6. Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Veld, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy, pp. 27.
7. B.L. Smith, H.D. Lasswell, and R.D. Casey, Propaganda, Communications, and Public Opinion, Princeton: 1946, p. 1, as quoted in Holt, pp. 26.
8. Paul Linbarger, Psychological Warfare, pp. 39.
9. JCS Pub 1, pp.274. as quoted in Kreisel, pp.7-A.
10. JCS Pub 1, pp. 273. as quoted in Kreisel, pp.5-A.
11. Fred W. Walker, "Truth is the Best Propaganda," National Guard Magazine, October 1987, pp. 28.

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17. **White, John Barker,** The Big Lie. New York: Thowas Y. Crowell Company 1955.
18. **Center for Strategic and International Studies.** International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations: Recommendations for the Future. Washington: 1975.

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